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Research subject 
•  Caracterization and analysis of common fault injection 
mechanism 
2 
Today’s subject 
•  Power glitches fault injection mechanism 
 Analysis and practice 
Agenda 
•  Timing constraints of synchronous digital IC 
•  Static stresses (global effect) 
•  Transient stresses 
•  Conclusion 
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How to inject faults through timing constraints 
violation? 
•  Overclocking: (Frequency increase, i.e. period decrease) 
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Tclk <  Dclk!Q + DpMax - Tskew +δsu 
•  Underpowering or overheating: (Propagation time increase) 
Tclk <  Dclk!Q + DpMax - Tskew +δsu 
Target 
•  Platform: FPGA Spartan 3A 
•  Algorithm: AES 128 bit 
none-secure implementation 
•  Frequency: 100 MHz 
•  Power supply: 1.2V 
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Experimental proof 
Common fault injection means 
•  Clock stress (overclocking) 
•  Power stress (underpowering) 
•  Overheating 
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A common mechanism ! 
⇒ Timing constraints 
violations. 
•  10,000 input dataset 
•  Critical path faulted 
DCIS 2012 - ,,,,,, 
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Issues 
•  Low timing resolution 
Transient perturbations 
•  Clock glitch 
•  Power supply glitch 
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Questions 
•  Injection mechanism? Timing violation? 
•  Achievable resolution? 
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Clock glitch 
Glitchy clk 
Tclk - ΔT 
•  35ps resolution 
•  Global effect 
•  Timing constraints violation (obvious) 
•  A tool for critical time measurement 
•  Used to build a template/reference library 
To be compared, 
Power glitch: Ideal 
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Power glitch: Input capacitance 
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Power glitch: impedance adaptation 
13 
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Power glitch: Input capacitance 
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Spartan 3A 
Power glitch: impedance adaptation 
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Power glitch 
•  Target a specific 
round but also affect 
the neighboring 
rounds, 
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1,2V 
1V •  Global offset must be 
added. 
70%  20%  
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Power glitch 
•  Analysis of injected faults: 
 70% identical to clock glitch injection 
 20% neighboring rounds 
 10% the second most critical path of the round 
   
•  Conclusion: Clock and power glitch induced faults are due 
to timing constraints violation  
•  >90% single-bit fault 
A spatial effect component? 
Linked to voltage transient propagation 
through the power supply grid 
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•  Voltage decrement => critical path increase  
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Metastability 
Data-dependency 
Underpowering 
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•  Injection mechanism? 
•  Overclocking, underpowering, overheating generate 
exactly the sames faults => same mechanism, 
•  Static stresses give accurate results BUT random 
temporal localization, 
•  Transient stresses give a better temporal localization 
BUT inducing spactial effect, 
•  Indepth investigation are going to explain these spatial 
effects. 
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Overclocking 
•  Fault occurrence rate vs applied stress 
Overheating  
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Metastability 
Data-dependency 
•  Temperature increase => critical path increase  
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δset-up δhold 
Qdownstream 
Setup time violation (i.e. timing constraint violation) : 
 ⇒ metastability (non-deterministic) 
 ‘1’ OR ‘0’ ? 
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Perturbation 
 ‘1’ OR ‘0’ ? 
Setup time violation (i.e. timing constraint violation) : 
 ⇒ metastability (non-deterministic) 
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Timing constraint violation : 
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Context 
•  Many of our daily used electronic devices embed 
cryptographic features, 
•  Often targeted by malicious attackers, 
•  Indepth understanding of attack means is needed to protect 
properly these devices. 
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Inverter : 
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•  Power Supply. 
  VDD      => tpLH  
•  Mobility :  
temperature dependent. 
 T°    => tpLH  
  (generally) 
